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High-level analogies between seemingly separate fields of study are powerful tools for both 
theory and hypothesis generation. Examples of this are not hard to find in the history of science. 
Explaining the properties of light required the use of at least two source analogs: that of physical 
objects such as billiard balls, or that of disturbances in some medium, such as waves. These two 
analogs, however, correspond to analogical comparisons which produce very different 
hypotheses. If light consists of a set of billiard-ball-like particles, they should be able to strike 
metal plates and displace electrons – known as the photoelectric effect. If light is more like a 
wave, then there must be some medium through which this wave propagates, which came to be 
known as the luminiferous aether. 
 We now know that the truth is much more complex than these analogies could have ever 
predicted; light behaves both like a particle and a wave. This famously counterintuitive result 
came to us through empirical experimentation, not analogical reasoning alone. But we must be 
careful to understand the role played by the analogical reasoning which got us to that point: the 
light-as-particle and light-as-wave analogies each committed to empirically testable, and 
seemingly incompatible hypotheses (the wave theory alone could not explain the photoelectric 
effect, and the particle theory had no need of the luminiferous aether). The strange behavior of 
light still today is explained to students using the analogies of particles and waves. These 
analogies persist in part because their source domains are so easy to understand (everyone has 
intuitive experience observing and interacting with physical objects bouncing off of each other 
and waves traveling through some medium).  
Evaluating high-level analogies, such as the one proposed by Michael Yong-Set between 
Ludologically-understood gaming and argumentation, can benefit tremendously by keeping in 
mind the example of particles vs. waves. For such an analogy to be of use, it does not necessarily 
need to produce empirically testable hypotheses. Neither does it need to produce a radically new 
way of conceptualizing the target domain. It does not even need to produce bold, new claims. 
But if it struggles to do all of these things, then one must at the very least ask why, if the high-
level analogy is worthwhile, this is the case. What exactly do we get out of this analogy that we 
would not have otherwise? 
Paul Bartha’s Articulation Model (AM) is a highly effective and algorithmic way to 
answer such questions (Bartha, 2010). According to AM, it is helpful to examine the analogy by 
imagining a back-and-forth between an advocate and a critic, ultimately assessing the analogy in 
terms of its ability to make explicit two elements: its prior association, and its potential for 
generalization.   
Broadly, an analogical argument’s prior association is “a clear connection, in the source 
domain, between the known similarities (the positive analogy) and the further similarity that is 
projected to hold in the target domain (the hypothetical analogy)” (Bartha, 2010). Making the 
prior association explicit in the source domain – that of ludologically-understood games – is the 
first step. There are multiple plausible candidates, but I will only discuss one, which we will call 
PA: Accommodating diverse player types encourages increased overall engagement in games, 
and not doing so harms engagement. Thus, we should accommodate diverse player types in 
models of gaming. To be sure, we’re skipping a few steps here. PA as stated above is a rather 
dense relationship involving many abstract elements, each of which could use more careful 
explication in a more systematic use of AM. But for brevity, let us assume that the end result of 
such an analysis would result in a high-level prior association like PA, which I believe to be a 
reasonable interpretation of Yong-Set’s intent. 
In any case, the next step is to assess PA’s potential for generalization by determining 
whether there are reasons to believe that PA has an analogue in the target domain (that of 
argumentation). Assuming a mapping of ‘players’ to ‘arguers’ and ‘games/gaming’ to 
‘arguments/argumentation,’ translating PA is mostly trivial word-replacing. However, it is not 
immediately clear what ‘engagement’ in the source analog should be mapped to in the target 
domain – and our choice turns out to be crucial. In the source domain, engagement is a principal 
goal of successful MUD game designers, for obvious reasons: more engagement means players 
will keep coming back, ultimately translating to more in-game purchases, advertisement views, 
and so on. Do the designers of argumentation platforms have a similar goal? 
If we are talking about the argumentation platforms predominantly studied by academics, 
their goals are not necessarily increased engagement, but rather lofty ideals such as clarity of 
communication, educational benefits, or argument quality. Translating PA then becomes 
something like PA1: Accommodating diverse arguer types encourages increased overall 
argument quality in arguments, and not doing so harms argument quality. Thus, we should 
accommodate diverse arguer types in models of argumentation. This is certainly not something 
that researchers in argumentation would accept unanimously, and it might therefore be the basis 
of empirically testable hypotheses. However, Yong-Set’s article does not present any empirical 
evidence in either direction, nor does it suggest that such work is forthcoming – an unfortunate 
omission, as high-level analogies are at their best when they generate testable hypotheses, but 
their usefulness tends to stop there, being able to only establish at most prima facie plausibility 
claims for those hypotheses.  
Perhaps, instead, the concept of ‘engagement’ in the source domain simply corresponds 
to itself in the target domain, as some parts of Yong-Set’s article seem to suggest. Translating 
then gives us PA2: Accommodating diverse arguer types encourages increased overall 
engagement in arguments, and not doing so harms engagement. Thus, we should accommodate 
diverse arguer types in models of argumentation. Although PA2, like PA1, does appear to be 
useful as the basis of empirically testable hypotheses, it raises another interesting question: Do 
we actually want more engagement in argumentation platforms? 
I am not so sure. Consider the example of social media and online discussion giants such 
as Facebook and Reddit, where more argumentative dialogues occur on a daily basis than across 
all academic or formal debate platforms combined (surpassing in quantity, but certainly not in 
quality). User engagement is certainly a priority of those organizations, for similar reasons as 
those of game designers: more people getting lured in to online arguments means more ad views, 
more comments means more free content, etc. To this end, countless behavioral tricks are 
employed which cater to diverse user types precisely in the way that a ludological approach 
would recommend. And they do this extremely well; to the degree that “social media addiction” 
is increasingly being taken seriously by psychologists.1 
“Taking arguers seriously” in light of online argumentation presumably requires 
understanding the reasons why everyday consumers of social media decide to engage, even if 
they are acting in bad faith, and it seems that a ludological approach to argumentation would be 
incomplete unless it addressed these. These arguer types and their reasons for participating do 
not obviously fall under the two-factor grid in Figure 2. For example, users may want to: troll, 
spread misinformation or disinformation, earn points (as in the upvote scores Reddit awards to 
comments) / likes / retweets, make other users or members or political groups feel bad, make 
one’s self feel better about their own views, and so on. Many social media users simply argue for 
the sake of arguing. Others rush to post forth controversial and uninformed views simply because 
they are conditioned to do so in response to provocative article headlines.  
Perhaps tackling the many problems of bad argumentation online, which I believe to be 
one of the greatest problems currently facing humanity, is asking too much of the ludological 
approach to argumentation. Instead, perhaps the recommendation that we incorporate arguer 
diversity into our models of argumentation is all that we can expect from it. But if this is the 
case, then the entire analogy loses what few teeth it seems to have. After all, Yong-Set 
acknowledges (p.4) that the call to recognize arguer diversity is not new. Let me close, then, with 
a recommendation that the ludological approach really dig deeper and more systematically into 
the analogy between gaming and argumentation in order to produce, and subsequently embrace, 
significantly bolder claims; i.e., what’s needed is not only to take arguers seriously, but to take 
the analogy seriously as well. 
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